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THE DOCTRINE OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY -THE
PERSISTENT VIGIL OF OUTDATED LAW

The doctrine of charitable iplmunity frees charitable institutions from any civil liability that may attach as a consequence
of the charity's tortious acts. The doctrine has been somewhat
delimited in Maryland, and after analyzing the historical and
legal basis of the doctrine, the author maintains that the
continued, qualified recognition of the doctrine in Maryland is
inequitable and without present legal justification.
INTRODUCTION
At one time representing the majority rule in this country, the
doctrine of charitable. immunityi has been subjected to severe criticism
within the past several decades. Many jurisdictions, through either
legislative or judicial cognizance, have come to the realization that
charities should answer for their torts as do other institutions and
individuals. Consequently, one authority has characterized the doctrine
as being in a state of "rapid overthrow of the immunity of charities, not
yet fully accomplished.,,2
Maryland, however, remains one of the few jurisdictions in this
country still adhering to the rule that as a matter of public policy,
eleemosynary institutions should be immune from liability to tort
claimants.3 Despite the fact that there are currently two statutes in
Maryland which somewhat limit the applicability and scope of the
doctrine,4 charitable immunity is still, in the words of a recent case,
"alive and reasonably well in Maryland.,,5
1. "The term immunity means exemption from liability which, but for the charitable nature

2.
3.
4.

5.

of the tortfeasor, would attach." Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 36 (1952). "In its legal sense,
charity comprises four principal divisions: (1) Trusts for the relief of poverty and distress;
(2) trusts for the advancement of education; (3) trusts for the advancement of religion; and
(4) trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the
preceding heads." Rabinowitz v. Wollman, 174 Md. 6, 10, 197 A. 566, 568 (1938) citing 11
CJ. Charities § 18 (1917); RFSTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 368 (1935).
W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS 994 (4th ed. 1971).
Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council Home, Inc., 249 Md. 233, 238 A.2d 863 (1968).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 480 (1972) provides:
Each policy issued to cover the liability of any charitable institution for
negligence or any other tort shall contain a provision to the effect that the insurer
shall be estopped from asserting, as a defense to any claim covered by said policy,
that such institution is immune from liability on the ground that it is a charitable
institution.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 556A (1971) provides:
No hospital or related institution as defined in this subtitle shall be immune from
liability for negligence or any other tort on the grounds that it is a charitable
institution, provided, however, that a hospital or related institution which is a
charitable institution and which is insured against such liability in an amount not
less than $100,000 shall not be liable for damages in excess of the limits of such
insurance.
Wood v. Abel, 268 Md. 214, 240, 300 A.2d 665, 678 (1973). The Wood court, however,
refused to extend the immunity doctrine to cover a negligent employee of the charity.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The doctrine of charitable immunity in its original form established
an immunity from liability which was total and complete. 6 Initially,
immunity was granted on the theory that public and private donations
which supported a charity constitule<i a trust fund, and it would be a
violation of the purposes for which the fund was set up and maintained
to pay money out of that fund to a plaintiff injured by the charity.
Maryland became the second American jurisdiction to adopt the
so-called "trust fund" theory of immunity, 7 in the case of Perry u.
House of Refuge. 8 The Perry court based its ruling on the English case
of Feoffees of Herriot's Hospihzl u. Ross9 in which Lord Cottenham, in
dictum, said: "To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to
apply it to those objects whom the author of the fund had in view, but
would be to divert it to a completely different purpose.'" 0
Later courts" (particularly in those jurisdictions abandoning the
immunity doctrine) have been quick to point out that the English cases
upon which the early American cases relied were overruled' 2 in
England prior to their being cited in this country. Nevertheless, with
recognition of the theory by Pennsylvania, ' 3 charitable immunity soon
attained prominence as the majority rule in this country.' 4
As quickly as other jurisdictions were to adopt the immunity
doctrine, so also were they to rest their decisions upon other than the
"trust fund" theory. Several jurisdictions based the tort exemption on
an "implied waiver" theory, or the reasoning that one, by accepting the
gratuitous benefits conferred upon him by the charity, in effect
"waived" his right to sue for negligence.' 5 Other courts sought to
buttress the "trust fund" theory by arguing that since the servants of
the charitable institution were not engaged in conducting the master's
business "for profit" that the doctrine of respondeat superior should
not apply where a plaintiff was injured by the negligent employee of
6. Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp., 149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965).
7. Massachusetts was the first. McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876),
followed the holding in Holliday v. St. Leonard's, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (C.B. 1861), which
adopted a similar dictum of Lord Cottenham's in Duncan v. Findlater, .7 Eng. Rep. 934
(H.L. 1839).
8. 63 Md. 20 (1885).
9. 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (H.L. 1846).
10. 63 Md. at 27, quoting from 8 Eng. Rep. at 1510.
11. See, e.g. President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
12. See Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93 (1866); Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L.R.
6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
13. See Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 A. 553 (1888).
14. .. [0 ]ther states followed ... each one speaking of the antiquity of the rule and assuming, as
the tower of authority rose, that the doctrine was sunk in the solid rock of historical fact,
ballasted with granite reason and buttressed with ever accumulating precedent." Flagiello
v. Fa. Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 500, 208 A.2d 193, 200 (1965).
15. See, e.g., Wilson v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 949
(1938); C'ook v. John N. Norton Memorial Hosp., 180 Ky. 331, 202 S. W. 874 (1918); Downs
v. Harper Hosp., 101 Mich. 555, 60 N.W. 42 (1894).
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the charity.! 6 The simplest and most realistic approach, however, was
taken by those courts which merely adopted, as a conclusion, that as a
matter of public policy, charitable institutions should be immune from
liability. 1 7
While it is neither the intent nor purpose of this paper to undertake a
detailed examination of the many exceptions to the rule which arose
depending upon which theory or theories a particular court espoused in
granting immunity, it should be noted that there being considerable
confusion among states as to the reasons for and the extent of the
doctrine, the "confusion expanded geometrically year by year as more
states adopted the doctrine. ,,1 8 In some states adopting one or more of
the various theOries, exceptions arose where non-trust fund assets of a
charity were available. 1 9 Under the "implied waiver" theory it has been
held that a "stranger" to the charity, or one who was not a beneficiary
of the charity, was entitled to damages. 2 0 Several states made the
further distinction between paying and non-paying patients, allowing
only the former the right of recovery.2! Needless to say, the original
rule of charitable immunity became "a relic in the multitude of
departures. ,,2 2
The eventual demise of the doctrine was signaled by the landmark
opinion in President and Directors of Georgetown College u. Hughes. 2 3
In that case, Justice Rutledge, then sitting on the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia wrote:
Human beings ordinarily are responsible for their own legally
careless action. They respond also for negligent harms inflicted
by their agents and employees. So do business corporations.
Likewise, trustees and other fiduciaries are liable for their own
negligence in administration and operation of the business or
property committed to their control. Respondeat superior more
and more has made them, as it has private corporations,
responsible for wrongs done by their inferior functionaries. 2 4
16. See, e.g., Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 98, 33 A. 595 (1895). Morrison v. Henke,
165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1916).
17. "In the final analysis it seems that the immunity of eleemosynary institutions to tort claims
is grounded on an assumed public policy against the enervation of public charities,
established for the benefit of the whole community by compensation of isolated
individuals for injuries inflicted by the negligence of the charities." Sanner v. Trustees of
Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 138, 139-40 (D. Md. 1968) cert. den.,
393 U.S. 982 (1968) citing 5 MD. L. REV. 336, 340 (1941).
18. Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Mo. 1969).
19. See, e.g., St. Mary's v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 P. 22 (1925); McLeod v. St. Thomas
Hosp., 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S.W.2d 917 (1936).
20. See, e.g., Cohen v. Gen. Hosp. Soc'y of Conn., 113 Conn. 188, 154 A. 435 (1931); Winona
Technical Institute v. Stolte, 173 Ind. 39, 89 N.E. 393 (1909); Bruce v. Cent. Methodist
Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951 (1907).
21. See, e.g., Tucker v. Mopile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Silva Providence
Hosp., 14 Cal. 2d ,(62, 97 P.2d 798 (1939); Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P.2d 645 (1939).
22. President and Directors of Georgetown Hosp. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 817 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
23. 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
24. [d. at 812.
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The opinion went on to say:
Generally also charity is. no defense to tort. For wrong done,
it is no answer to say, "He did not pay and was not bound to
pay for the service. I gave it to him." One who undertakes to
aid another must do so with due care. 2 5
The opinion, considered one of the most comprehensive and detailed
ever undertaken on the subject, "reviewed all the arguments in favor of
the immunity, and demolished them so completely as to change the
whole course of the law."2 6 By attacking the doctrine on both its
historical 27 and theoretical 28 foundations the opinion reached the
inevitable conclusion that, "the incorporated charity should respond as
do private individual business corporations and others, when it does
good in the wrong way. ,,2 9
At the time of the Georgetown Hospital decision, scarcely four states
had imposed unqualified liability on charities. 3 0 Full liability is now
the law in a majority of jurisdictions. 3 1 In those states still adhering to
earlier decisions, there exists for the most part only a qualified or
partial immunity in which ultimate liability may depend upon the
character of the institution,32 the availability of non-trust fund assets
25. [d. at 812-13.
26. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 996 (4th ed. 1971).
27. "[A 1 rule of ahsolute immunity which grew out of dicta pointing the plaintiff to another
source of recovery and involved an application or misapplication of the law of trusts to a
corporate situation, hardly gains permanence from its origin." 130 F.2d at 817.
28. "For negligent or tortious conduct liability is the rule. Immunity is the exception." [d. at
812.
29. [d. at 828.
30. [d. at 819 n. 35.
31. See PreSident and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1942); Howard v. Sisters of Charity, 193 F. Supp. 191 (D. Mont. 1961); Tuengel v. City
of Sitka, 118 F. Supp. 399 (D. Alas. 1954); Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22,
230 P.2d 220 (1951); Malloy v. Fong, 37 CaL 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Durney v. St.
Francis Hosp., 46 DeL 350, 83 A.2d 753 (1951); Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145
Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940); Bell v. The Presbytery of Boise, 91 Idaho 374. 421 P.2d 745
(1966); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326,211 N.E.2d 253
(1965); Harris v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 250 Ind. 491, 237 N.E.2d 242 (1968);
Sullivan v. First Presbyterian Church, 260 Iowa 1373, 152 N.W.2d 628 (1967); Noel v.
Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954); Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp., 348
S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1961); Garlington v. Kingsley, -1.a._, 289 So. 2d 88 (1974); Colby v.
Carney Hosp., q56 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361
Mich. 1, 105 N. W.2d 1, (1960); Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn.
392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920); Miss. Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142
(1951); Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's Hosp., 446 S. W.2d 599 (Mo. 1969); Kardulas v.
Dover, 99 N.H. 359, 111 A.2d 327 (1955); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y. 2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3,
(1957); Rickbiel v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946);
Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium and Benevolent Ass'n, 235 Ore. 412, 383 P.2d 1009
(1963); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965); Howle v. Camp
Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1971); Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hosp., 94
Utah 460, 78 P.2d 645 (1938); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230
(1950); Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp., 149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965); Christy v.
Schwartz, 49 Wis. 2d 760, 183 N.W.2d 81 (1971).
32. See, e.g., Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council Home, Inc., 249 Md. 233, 238 A.2d 863 (1968);
Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966) (non-profit charitable hospitals not
exempt from tort liability); Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485
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such as liability insurance,3 3 or in some states, the status of the
particular plaintiff. 34
THE MARYLAND VIEW
Maryland has developed a somewhat unique stance in regard to the
doctrine of charitable immunity. This is perhaps attributable to the fact
that in this state the doctrine is a product of both the courts and the
legislature. 3 5 The courts have, in the absence of legislation, strictly
adhered to the trust fund theory. In Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard
and Enoch Pratt Hospital,3 6 while recognizing that some states had
adopted a policy of holding the charity liable to paying patients or
non-beneficiaries of the charity, the court noted that the trust fund
theory, as adopted in Perry was "without qualification,,37 and
thereupon denied recovery to the plaintiff, who was injured in the
course of fighting a fire on the charity's premises. 3 8
The Maryland courts have gone even so far as to indicate that, in the
absenc'e of legislation to the contrary, a defendant charity could
nonetheless plead immunity even when the charity had a liability
insurance policy in effect. 3 9 Recognizing, however, that many charities
voluntarily procured liability insurance4 0 and that "except to the
extent to the premiums voluntarily paid, there would be no invasion of
the trust funds," 41 in 1948 the State legislature passed the following
law amending the insurance code in order to prevent insurers from

33.

34.

35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

41.

(1967) (charitable immunity abolished as applied to hospitals); Fournier v. Miriam Hosp.,
93 R.I. 299, 175 A.2d 298, (1961) (1962) (statute granting immunity to charitable hospitals
held constitutional).
See, e.g., Michard v. Myron Stratton Home, 144 Colo. 251, 355 P.2d 1078 (1960)
(execution may be levied on non-trust property); Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc.,
25 Ga. App. 713, 188 S.E.2d 915 (1972) (income producing rental property of charitable
non-profit corporation held not immune from execution of a judgment for tort); Webb v.
Blount Memorial Hosp., 196 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
See, e.g., Vitolo v...St. Peter's Church, 118 N.J. Super. 35, 285 A.2d 570 (1972) (The court
based its decision on the New Jersey statute which specifically allows immunity when
beneficiaries are the victims of the tort. N.J.S.A. 2A: 53A-7 (Supp. 1974-75»; Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 108 S.E.2d 388 (1959) (liability as to beneficiaries only
where the charity fails to exercise due care in selection and retention of employees).
See, e.g., Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council Home, Inc., 249 Md. 233. 238 A.2d 863 (1968);
Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hosp., 130 Md. 265,100 A. 301, (1917);
Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885) and MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 480 (1971); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 43, § 556A (1971).
130 Md. 265, 100 A. 301 (1917).
Id. at 271, 100 A. at 303.
Id. at 266, 100 A. at 301.
See Thomas v. Prince Georges County, 200 Md. 554, 92 A.2d 452 (1952).
As said in 10 Am. Jur. 645, "Charities" sec. 84, "where there is a general
overriding intention to establish a trust for charitable purposes, but some of the
particular purposes to which the fund may be applied are not strictly charitable the
trust is good and the court will give effect to the general charitable trust, but the
trustees are restricted from applying the fund to purposes or in ways which are
objectionable ...
Rabinowitz v. Wollman, 174 Md. 6, 11, 197 A. 566, 568(1938).
State v. Arundel Park Corp., 218 Md. 484, 488, 147 A.2d 427, 428 (1959).
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using the charitable immunity doctrine to avoid payment of liability
claims:
Each policy issued to cover the liability of any charitable
institution for negligence or any other tort shall contain a
provision to the effect that the insurer shall be estopped from
asserting, as a defense to any claim covered by said policy, that
such institution is immune from liability on the ground that it is
a charitable institution. 4 2
While the statute may have had a great effect upon liability insurers,
the effect upon the charities themselves was negligible. They still
enjoyed the immunity in that if they decided not to purchase any
insurance they would still have full immunity, and if they did purchase
insurance, the liability was only to the extent of insurance available to
cover a particular loss covered by the policy.43 Although this
legislation presented the first inroad to the potential demise of the
doctrine, it also reflected a recognition of the doctrine's continuing
existence. The fact remains that the statute does not provide any
incentive to procure insurance. While the purchase of insurance may
indicate a feeling of moral obligation on the part of a charity, a failure
to do so would be of no consequence; the doctrine still applies.
With recognition of the doctrine of charitable immunity by the
legislature, the courts became even more adamant in their refusal to
abandon the doctrine. In Howard v. South Baltimore General
Hospital,44 the Maryland Court of Appeals stated "the principle that
charitable corporations are free from tort liability has long been a basic
part of the law of this state;"4S and further, "the legislature has
accepted the doctrine announced by this court and dealt with the
matter in its own fashion. ,04 6 The court thereupon denied recovery to
the plaintiff, a paying patient of a charity hospital.
In 1966, the legislature made its second incursion into the field of
charitable immunity, which had a much more profound effect upon
certain charities, specifically, hospitals and related institutions. 47 The
applicable statute reads as follows:
No hospital or related institution as defined in this subtitle
shall be immune from liability for. negligence or any other tort
on the grounds that it is a charitable institution; provided,
however that a hospital or related institution which is a
charitable institution -and which is insured against such liability
42. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 480 (1972).
43. See Cornelius v. Sinai Hosp.t 219 Md. 116, 148 A.2d 567 (1959).
44. 191 Md. 617, 62 A.2d 574 (1948).
45. [d. at 618, 62 A.2d at 575.
46. [d. at 620, 62 A.2d at 575.
47. Related institutions are classified as nursing homes or care homes. See MD. ANN. CODE
art. 43, § 556 (e) (1971).
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in an amount not less than $100,000 shall not be liable for
damages in excess of the limits of such insurance. 4 8
The statute is self-explanatory; hospitals can no longer invoke the
doctrine of charitable immunity. It is apparent, however, that the
legislature maintained strong feelings about the doctrine, as evidenced
by the fact that even the hospital's liability remains limited where there
is a liability insurance policy in the amount of $100,000.
Notwithstanding this removal of a large class of charitable
organizations from the charitable immunity protection, the doctrine
was called upon in 1968 to shield an allegedly negligent charity which
did not fall· within the Hospital statute. In Howard v. Bishop Byrne
Council Home, Inc.,4 9 the plaintiff was seriously injured when he was
struck by a falling tree which had been cut by an employee or servant
of the charity. After a comprehensive review of the law of Maryland
and other jurisdictions,5 0 once again the court concluded that in view
of the legislative action which had been taken, it was not within the
province of the court to abrogate the immunity rule. 5 I Despite the
court's recognition of the inequities of the rule, it was content to place
the burden of any change on the legislature and otherwise adhere to
stare decisis. 5 2
Finally, in a more recent case, Wood v. Abel,5 3 while the question of
overruling charitable immunity was not directly presented to the court,
the court refused to extend the immunity doctrine to cover a negligent
employee of the charity.54 In doing so, however, the court did manage
to maintain its adherence to the "trust fund" theory of Perry, stating:
[T] here is no sound reason for extending the cloak [ of
immunity] to a negligent employee. Recovery against him can
in no way do violence to the "trust fund" theory, upon which
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 556A (1971).
49. 249 Md. 233, 238 A.2d. 863 (1968).
SO. The Byrne court noted that eight states agreed with Maryland that eleemosynary
institutions should be immune from liability to tort claimants. See Howard v. Bishop
Byrne Council Home, 249 Md. 233, 237, 238 A.2d 863, 865 (1968) n.2. Since the time of that
decision, three ofthose states have abandoned the immunity. See Colby v. Carney Hosp.,
356 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969); Garlington v. Kingsley, -1.a_, 289 So. 2d 88
(1974); Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1971).
51. "We again restate our opinion that the General Assembly has completely investigated the
immunity question, and the present statutes are tangible evidence that the legislature
arrived at a solution which it deemed satisfactory." Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council
Home, 249 Md. 233, 241-42, 238 A.2d 863, 868 (1969).
52. Cf. Justice Brand's dissent in Landgraver v. Emmanuel Lutheran Charity Board, 203 Ore.
489, 526, 280 P.2d 301. 317 (1955) which states:
It must first be borne in mind that the rule of stare decisis has no application
unless the facts on which the earlier case was decided are substantially the same as
those now before the court. We need not contend that the earlier cases in this state
were bad law. We do contend that the changes which have occurred in the size and
activities of charities ... now present a different problem based on new facts.
53. 268 Md. 214, 300 A.2d 665 (1973).
54. See 33 MD. L. REV. 500 (1973).
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the doctrine is predicated. Nothing has been presented here to
support a conclusion that recovery against Wood would lead to
an invasion of trust funds held by the Association, if there are
any. 5 5
SUMMARY
At the time of its inception in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, the trust fund theory protected all charities. s 6 Like the
various exemptions from different forms of taxation, it is quite
probably true that it was granted to charitable institutions "in order
that their field of usefulness might be enlarged,"S 7 at a time when the
possibility existed that a substantial award in a single negligence action
might destroy the charity. 5 8 Therefore, criticism of the earlier cases
may be somewhat unjustified in view of the nature and size of the
institutions at that time. What must be done, however, is to examine
the present state of law vis a vis the modem-day charity.
The modem-day charity bears little resemblance to its predecessor.
From their humble beginning as institutions depending upon "the
humane instincts of individuals or small informal groups,"S 9 charities
have gradually evolved into "a thing of steel and stone and electricity,
of boards and committees, of card indices and filing systems, and of
rules and regulations.,,6 0 In those jurisdictions which have recognized
that charitable corporations are "big business" and subject to the tort
liabilities the same as any other business, it has been demonstrated that
they are more than able to withstand substantial jqdgments without
either resulting in the termination of their activities or any diminishment of donations. 6 1 Similarly, the simple fact that charities can
procure liability insurance should defeat any argument that donations
would be used for the payment of damages to a tort victim.
The fact that the doctrine of charitable immunity is not necessarily
equitable has been at least partially recognized by the Maryland
legislature. While it is true that what little recognition there has been of
the doctrine has resulted in the limitation of the doctrine, what has also
resulted is the perpetuation of a rule which should have been discarded
years ago. 6 2
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

268 Md. 214 at 242-43, 300 A.2d at 679.
Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp., 149 W. Va. 705,.143 S.E.2d 154 (1965).
Howard v. South Baltimore Gen. Hosp., 191 Md. 617, 619, 62 A.2d 574, 575 (1948).
"rr]he trust fund might be entirely destroyed, and diverted from the purpose which the
donor gave it." Loeftler v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hosp., 130 Md. 265, 270,
100 A. 301, 303 (1917).
Freezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. PA. L.Rev. 191, 195 (1928).
Id. at 196.
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 171, 260 P.2d 765, 770
(1953).
"Whatever the law may have been regarding charitable institutions in the past, it does
not meet the conditions of today." Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 493, 208
A.2d 193, 196 (1965). Accord, Abernathy v. Sisters ofSt. Mary's Hosp., 446 S.W.2d 599
(Mo. 1969); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765
(1953).
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As the law stands in Maryland today, satisfaction of a judgment
ae;ainst a charity with the exception of charitable hospitals, depends
upon whether or not the organization in question has voluntarily
procured a liability insurance policy and whether or not that particular
policy is designed to cover the type of claim involved. For example,
where a charity is insured for general liability only, and is sued for a
tort not covered by the particular policy (e.g. professional negligence,
libel, false arrest, etc.) unless the basis of the suit falls within the
boundaries of coverage provided, the injured plaintiff cannot recover. 6 3
There also remains the question that if trust fund assets can properly
be spent to pay premiums on liability insurance, can there be any
reason left why the trustee could not use these funds to pay the
liability itself in the absence of insurance? Finding no valid answer to
the above question, the court in Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital, 64 wrote:
[A] doctrine which limits 'the liability of charitable corporations to the amount of liability insurance that they see fit to
carry permits them to determine whether or not they will be
liable for their torts and the amount of that liability, if any.
Whether or not particular assets of a charitable corporation are
subject to exemption from execution in order to satisfy a
judgment does not determine liability.6 5
It is a strange doctrine indeed when insurance becomes the ultimate
criterion of liability. It is even a stranger doctrine which holds that
where immunity is given to a charity on a theory that the trustee or
administrator is without power to dissipate trust funds through the
payment of damages, yet allows the trustee to waive the immunity by
failing to defend on that ground. 6 6
The remnants of the doctrine as it exists in Maryland today basicaWy
protect two types of charities. First, those who recognize the law as it is
and realize that it is unnecessary to procure liability insurance (in view
of the fact that the trust fund theory will exempt them from liability),
and second, those charities which quite possibly might not have
sufficient monetary resources to purchase insurance. With due
acknowledgement to the fact that there exist today charitable
institutions which are already financially strained, can it be said that
this is sufficient reason to exempt them from all tort liability?6 7 The
63. See Cornelius v. Sinai Hospital, 219 Md. 116, 148 A.2d 567 (1959).
64. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965) cert. den., 386 U.S. 946 (1965).
65. Ii:l~ at 337-38, 211 N.E.2d at 260.
66. MD. R. elV. P. 323 § b reads in part: "The defense of total or partial charitable ...
immunity shall be raised by motion pursuant to this rule .... "
The rule requires that .the defense of total or partial immunity be raised and determined
at an early stage in the proceedings. A failure to do so will result a waiver of the defense;
any judgment for the plaintiff will be binding on the charity.
67. "There are, no doubt, many of the latter struggling for existence .... The injured party
suffers no less damage by the carelessness of 'little' than he does by that of the 'big' charitable institution." Abernathy v. Sister's of St. Mary's Hosp., 446 S.W.2d 599, 604 (Mo.
1969).
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social benefits to be derived from either of these two classes of charities
would at the very least seem questionable. As was stated in the case of
Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic' Church: 6 8
When an institution owes a duty of care to another and, as a
result of carrying on its activities through agents whether the
enterprise or activity involves financial gain or not and no
matter how lofty the purpose or motive, injures another ... the
breach of duty ought not to be excused or justified on the
grounds of the laudable purpose or the public benefit of the
activity causing the injury. 6 9
Despite all the arguments in favor of total abrogation of the doctrine,
the posture of the Maryland courts seems to be quite imn. However,
this has also been the case with many other jurisdictions in which the
charitable immunity was eventually abandoned.' 0 In the Georgetown
Hospital case, Justice Rutledge remarked: "Opinions continue to speak
in the set pattern, often when holding to only the last remnant of
irresponsibility.'" 1 That statement might adequately sum up the
Maryland position. Stare decisis has taken on an added significance in
Maryland in view of the fact that the Maryland Court has held that
legislative recognition of the judicial rule prevents it from overruling its
prior decision.' 2 If the court is to adhere to this position in the future
it might be well for the legislature to reconsider the Hospital Statute
with a view to applying it to all charitable institutions. There is no
rational justification for distinguishing between hospitals and other
charities. The injured party suffers no less at the hands of one than the
other. '3 If the hospital is to be held liable, albeit limited, so too should
the charities that provide services other than medical care. c
c

CONCLUSION

The present state of the law in Maryland today, while providing in
some cases an adequate source of recovery for many plaintiffs injured
at the hands of a charity, can nonetheless result in the denial of
recovery based upon an archaic doctrine which does not take into
consideration modem-day concepts of tort liability nor the nature of
68. 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W.2d 249 (963).
69. Jd. at 656, 121 N.W.2d ai 254.
70. See, e.g., Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp., 149 W. Va. 705, 719, 143 S.E.2d 154, 163 (1965), in
which the court stated: "Consideration of the future and permanent good of the public,
rather than that of a particular interest, requires a departure from the cases heretofore
decided by this Court, wherein the doctrine of charitable immunity was embraced."
Accord, Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp., 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1961); Bell v. The Presbytery of
Boise, 91 Ida. 374, 421 P.2d 745 (1966).
71. President and.Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 817 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
72. See Howard v. South Baltimore General Hosp., 191 Md. 617, 62 A.2d 574 (1948).
73. See Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's Hosp., 446 S.W.2d 599,604 (Mo. 1969).
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the institutions the law protects. To persist in the application of
particular laws to certain types of charities, holding some liable while
others not, with recovery dependent upon the extraneous factor of
whether the charity voluntarily procures liability insurance, seems
illogical. As one court has stated: "The public policy with which we are
here concerned ... must be based upon general conditions and the
average situation. It cannot be designed to meet exceptional cases or
deal with particular instances of hardship.'" 4
Liability fosters care, immunity neglect.' 5 While it is indeed socially
and morally admirable to encourage the good works of charity and
recognize their benefit to society, there is a social, moral and, in most
states, legal obligation on the part of any individual or corporation to
compensate an injured party for the damages it causes. "Charity
suffereth long and is kind," remarked Justice Rutledge, "but in the
common law it cannot be careless.'" 6
Michael L. Wilsman
74. Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 171,260 P.2d 765, 770
(1953).
75. President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 824 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
76. [d. at 813.

